OAuth HTTP routes set `CORSMiddleware(allow_origins="*")` on token/register/metadata endpoints |

[tiagovilasboas]

Static review of public source at commit 6affe5c0d358. No traffic was sent to any MCP environment.

OAuth route helpers wrap several endpoints with Starlette CORSMiddleware and a wildcard origin:

src/mcp/server/auth/routes.py:

def _cors(app: ASGIApp, allow_methods: list[str]) -> ASGIApp:
    return CORSMiddleware(
        app=app,
        allow_origins="*",
        allow_methods=allow_methods,
        allow_headers=[MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION_HEADER],
    )

That wrapper is used for /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, /token, and (when enabled) /register and /revoke. Wildcard ACAO is intentional for browser-based inspectors, and allow_credentials is not set here (browsers will not attach cookies under the * + credentials rule). Still, token and dynamic-registration endpoints are sensitive: a wildcard makes any future “reflect Origin + credentials” change, or a non-browser client that ignores CORS, easier to misuse.

Suggested change:

• Keep * only on public metadata handlers.
• For /token, /register, and /revoke, take an explicit allowed_origins list (or reuse TransportSecuritySettings.allowed_origins) and document the Inspector origin as an example allowlist entry.
• Add a one-line comment that credentials must stay off while * remains.

Severity: low / configuration clarity and defense-in-depth. Not reported as an exploitable CORS bypass with the current header pair. No proof-of-concept.

Happy to send a focused PR if useful.